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1956] FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY LAws 607 
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE AMERICAN 
POOR LAWS:II* 
Daniel R. Mandelkert 
IV. ENFORCING THE SUPPORT DUTY 
A. Civil Support Actions Under the Statute 
No substantive statutory provision fulfills the purpose for which it was enacted unless fair and efficient procedures 
are provided for its enforcement. Under the Elizabethan family 
responsibility law, enforcement was confined to the parish justices 
of the peace, who at that time exercised both administrative and 
judicial functions.115 The blending of administrative and judicial 
functions no longer being the rule in American local government, 
practically all of the American family responsibility statutes pro-
vide for some judicial procedure by which the support duty may 
be enforced. The basic issue with which the courts have been 
concerned in applying these statutory remedies may be pointed up 
by first considering those few American laws which state the sup-
port duty but provide no remedy.11 6 Under such a statute the 
California Supreme Court, in Paxton v. Paxton,117 held that the 
statement of the duty implies a remedy and, on this basis, allowed 
a dependent person to bring an action in equity for future support 
against a responsible relative. The South Dakota court, while 
first holding that a similar statute authorized only an action by 
the county for assistance already given,118 later, in Mower v. 
• Part I was published in the February 1956 issue, 54 MICH. L. R.Ev. 497.-Ed. 
t B.A. 1947, LL.B. 1949, University of Wisconsin; Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana 
'University.-Ed. 
115 FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 3-5 (1949). 
116 Cal. Civ. Code (1949) §206; La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) art. 229 et seq.; Okla. 
Stat. Ann. (1951) tit. 10, §12; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §109.010; S. D. Code (1939) §14.0312. 
A remedy is provided, however, in the family responsibility sections of Oregon's public 
assistance law. See also N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §14-0910 (domestic relations law), pro• 
viding only that the support duty may be enforced by a person furnishing necessaries. 
The statute does not indicate whether this remedy is exclusive. See note 132 infra. The 
family responsibility provision in the general assistance law provides a remedy. Cf. 
Sharum v. Sharum, 101 Okla. 273, 225 P. 682 (1924). 
117150 Cal. 667, 89 P. 1083 (1907), noted, 1 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 65 (1912). The court 
relied on a provision of the California Civil Code directing that, where no procedure is 
prescribed by statute, any appropriate procedure may be used. But cf. State Dept. of 
Public Welfare v. Shirley, 243 Wis. 276, 10 N.W. (2d) 215 (1943). See also Cunningham 
v. Cunningham, 72 Conn. 157, 44 A. 41 (1899), where the court interpreted the statute 
in a manner that avoided the question. 
118 McCook Co. v. Kammoss, 7 S.D. 558, 64 N.W. 1123 (1895). The court indicated 
that the county was "coerced" into paying assistance. This comment is apt if general 
assistance is a right and may not be refused in the discretion of the county officials. This 
and other statements by the court indicate that its opinion was based on restitution 
theory. 
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Mower,11 9 allowed a dependent person to enforce the support duty 
by securing an order for future support in a divorce action. 
Whether the court should imply a remedy in cases like this 
would seem to depend on what was accomplished by the enactment 
of the Elizabethan law. If there was only a moral duty of support 
prior to its enactment then there would seem to be no reason for 
passing the statute except to make what was only a moral duty 
legally enforceable. This was accomplished under the English 
law by entrusting enforcement to officials exercising administrative 
and judicial duties. As the American laws are based on the 
English model, it would seem in keeping with the intent of the 
English statute to imply a judicial remedy where none is pro-
vided.120 
Under statutes providing a remedy the same question comes 
up in different form and is put in terms of whether the remedy 
provided by statute is meant to be exclusive. In several cases in 
which the responsible relative was under guardianship by reason 
of incompetency, the dependent person, or the responsible rela-
tive's guardian, petitioned the court having jurisdiction over the 
estate of the incompetent to make an allowance for support of the 
dependent out of the incompetent's estate. This disregards the 
remedy provided in the family responsibility statute, which does 
not explicitly anticipate this type of proceeding. Applying the 
rule that the statutory remedy is exclusive where both duty and 
remedy are an innovation to the common law, the Wisconsin 
court has not allowed such an action.121 Other courts have taken 
the contrary position on the basis that the statutory remedy is not 
exclusive.122 
Both of the problems discussed so far raise fundamentally the 
same question: was the statute meant to be exclusive both as to 
119 47 S.D. 353, 199 N.W. 42 (1924). 
120 Some of those jurisdictions not providing a remedy are civil code jurisdictions. 
The purpose of a civil code appears to be to state rights and duties which are to be 
enforced by the courts, and on this basis it would appear that the implication of a remedy 
was intended. Cf. Ga. Code Ann. (1936) §3-105 ("for every right there shall be a remedy"). 
121 In re Heck's Guardianship, 325 Wis. 636, 275 N.W. 520 (1937). The court reached 
its result in spite of the fact that the guardianship statute authorized the application 
of the incompetent's estate to the support of his family. 
122 Gamble v. Leva, 212 Ala. 155, 102 S. 120 (1924) (petition by guardian of estate). 
A similar result has been reached in California, where the statute provides no remedy. 
Estate of Lynch, 5 Coff. (Cal.) 279 (1894) (petition by dependent person). In each state the 
guardianship statute provided that the incompetent's estate should be used to support 
members of his family, and the courts looked to .the family responsibility statute to find 
a duty to provide for the dependent relatives which it named. 
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what was included and omitted with regard to available remedies? 
Legislative intent does not seem to be strained by recognizing the 
family responsibility statute as creating a substantive duty of sup-
port which, regardless of the particular form of action provided, 
would seem to be capable of being enforced in any context in 
which it is appropriate. In one case, for example, in which a son 
sued his mother for rent of a dwelling under a lease between the 
parties, the mother counterclaimed on the ground that she was 
poor and that the rent was but a reasonable contribution by the 
son for her support. This court dismissed the counterclaim on 
the ground that it was not properly pleaded.123 Assuming that 
it was, however, it would seem to be more fair to the parties to 
try out the substantive duty in an action before the court than to 
force them to their statutory remedy. A similar question arises 
where one of the parties to the support relationship attempts to 
rely on the duty imposed by the statute in asserting rights against 
third parties. A typical case would be one where a dependent 
parent sues a third party wrongdoer for the death of an adult son, 
claiming that the death of the son gives rise to a cause of action 
for the loss of support owing under the family responsibility act. 
Again, the courts seem to be divided on whether they should 
allow such an action.124 
The question of the exclusiveness of the statutory remedy be-
comes important with regard to determining who may enforce 
the support duty, the dependent person entitled to support, a third 
party who has extended aid to the person in need, or the com-
munity. An examination of this question will indicate whether 
the statute in fact operates efficiently to afford support to depend-
ent persons whenever it is needed. 
123 Fitzke v. Fitzke, 210 Minn. 430, 298 N.W. 712 (1941). This case was complicated 
by the fact that the Minnesota statute does not afford a remedy to the dependent person 
but provides for a suit by the welfare official only. 
124 The following cases are representative. In Mercer v. Jackson, 54 Ill. 397 (1870), 
the court did not allow a father to recover for the wrongful death of his adult son. 
Although the father apparently qualified as a dependent person under the family 
responsibility law, the court held that the statutory remedy under that law was exclusive. 
Accord, Allen v. Trester, 112 Neb. 515, 199 N.W. 841 (1924) (suit by mother against 
employer for injuries incapacitating her son). However, in Clinton v. Laning, 61 Mich. 
355, 28 N.W. 125 (1886), an adult son was rendered helpless by the negligence of the 
defendant. His father, who was then compelled to support him, was allowed to recover 
the amount expended from the defendant. The court relied on the father's duty, created 
by the family responsibility law, to support his indigent son. See also Bruce v. Tobin, 
39 S.D. 64, 162 N.W. 933, cert. den. 245 U.S. 18, 38 S.Ct. 7 (1917), holding that a father 
was entitled to recover for the death of a son under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. His damages were measured by the support he was entitled to receive under the 
family responsibility law in his old age. There was no showing that the father was 
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About two-thirds of the family responsibility statutes provide 
for an action by public officials only, either those charged· with 
administering general assistance or by others at the request of the 
relief official.125 Under a statute of this type the courts are divided 
on the question of whether the dependent person may also sue 
the responsible relative. Some courts say no, indicating that the 
statute may not be extended beyond its terms,126 while other courts, 
ignoring this rule, have held that the statute implies that the de-
pendent person may also sue.127 
Which position is correct would seem to depend on whether 
the designation of the persons who may enforce the support obliga-
tion is a matter of substance or pr~cedure. This is not an easy 
question to answer. It could be contended that a part of the sub-
stantive right is the designation of the person to whom that right 
is owing, in terms of who may bring a_ legal action to enforce it. 
In this event, actions under a statute of the type described would 
be limited to the public officials enumerated. But it might also 
be contended that the statute states a substantive duty to the de-
pendent person in any event, and that the question of who may 
enforce it then becomes one of procedure. Under the latter inter-
pretation, a court which wanted to take a "liberal" view of the 
in need of family support at the qme of the son's death or that he would have needed 
it in the foreseeable future. Under workmen's compensation laws the courts generally 
seem to have required that a claimant cannot recover for the death -of a dependent 
unless the dependent was actually furnishing the claimant with support at the time. 
LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION I.Aw §63.31 (1952). Contra, Mattis v. Arcadia Coal Co., 
148 Pa. Super. 462, 25 A. (2d) 610 (1942) (duty of support under family responsibility 
law). 
125 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 44, §8; Alaska Laws (1953) c. 110, §§13, 14; Ariz. Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1952) §70-605; Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code (1952) §2576; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 
124, §1; Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1953) §llllc; Ga. Code Ann. (1936) §23-2303; Idaho 
Code Ann. (1948) §32-1002; Ill. StaL Ann. (Supp. 1955) c. 23, §§436-12, 439-2; Iowa 
Code Ann. (1949) §252.6; Me. Laws (1953) c. 308, §97; Mass. Ann. Laws (1949) c. 117, 
§7; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §261.02; Miss. Code Ann. (1952) §7357; Nev. Comp. Laws 
(Supp. 1949) §5140.01; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 124, §18; N.Y. Social Welfare Law 
(Supp. 1955) §§102 (1), 104 (l); N.Y. Criminal Code (1945) §915; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) 
§50-0119; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 69, §6; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §17-14-1; W.Va. Code 
Ann. (1949) §626 (151); Wis. Stat. (1953) §52.01 (2). 
126 Stark v. Jersey City, 90 N.J.L. 187, 100 A. 340 (1917); State v. Ackerman, 55 
N.J.L. 422, 27 A. 807 (1893); In re Salm's Guardianship, 171 Misc. 367, 12 N.Y.S. (2d) 
678 (1939), affd. 258 App. Div. 875, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 1022 (1939), affd. per curiam, 282 
N.Y. 765, 27 N.E. (2d) 46 (1940). Cf. Schwerdt v. Schwerdt, 141 Ill. App. 386 (1908) 
(dictum), affd. on other grounds, 235 Ill. 386, 85 N.E. 613 (1908). Cf. People v. Williams, 
161 Misc. 573, 292 N.Y.S. 458 (1936) (parent not criminally liable for nonsupport when 
demand not made by public official). 
127 Cunningham v. Cunningham, 72 Conn. 157, 44 A. 41 (1899); Citizens & Southern 
Nat. Bank v. Cook, 182 Ga. 240, 185 $.E. 318 (1936), relying on Ga. Code Ann. (1936) 
§3-105. See note 120 supra. 
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procedures that are available under the statute might well find 
that the dependent person as well as the public official has a right 
to the action. 
Whatever interpretation is adopted, the advisability of allow-
ing a direct suit by the dependent relative seems open to question. 
First of all, little is to be gained by such a suit if all that may be 
demanded is support equal to that which would be provided by 
the assistance authorities. If this is the case, the dependent person 
might just as well file his application for aid and let the relief 
officials enforce the support duty. Futhermore, it is conceivable 
that allowing the dependent personally to confront the responsible 
relative with a claim for help in a court of law might be more 
disruptive of the family relationship than if the same claim were 
to be presented by a disinterested third party. There could be 
particularly disruptive effects if dependent persons, knowing such 
a remedy to be available, threatened to resort to judicial pro-
cedure. It may be better to limit the private action to the family 
support duties that arise out of the immediate, interdependent 
family relationship in which the standard of support that is im-
posed is based on the station-in-life test. This approach assumes, 
of course, that the welfare officials are doing their job adequately 
(and that the applicant need not bring a court action for support 
as a prerequisite to receiving relief). Because of the inadequacy 
of relief administration in some areas, and the frank admission 
by some general assistanGe administrators that not all those in need 
can be taken care of, it might be necessary to provide by statute 
that the responsible relative may be sued directly where public 
relief, for one reason or another, is not forthcoming. In any event, 
several statutes provide both for an action by the welfare official 
and the dependent person,128 and a few statutes limit the remedy 
to the dependent person only.129 
128 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 13, §501 (also on complaint of "any person interested''); 
Hawaii Rev. Laws (1945) c. 298, §12,290; ID. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §439-2; Ind. Stat. 
Ann. (Supp. 1955) §3-3002; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §16.123 (action may be 
brought by officials and by a "dependent parent''); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1953) §§71-238, 
71-239; Neb. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1953) §68-101; (}re. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§411.434, 411.438; 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 62, §1973 (b) (also on complaint of "any other person"); 
Vt. Laws (1953) No. 196, §3; Va. Code (1950) §20-64. 
The New Jersey law would seem to accomplish the same result simply by authorizing 
the institution of a suit by "any person." N.J. Rev. Stat. (1940) §44:1-140. For a case 
construing a similar provision see O'Connor's Appeal, 104 Pa. 437 (1883) (person having 
an "interest" in dependent's support held to include the dependent himself). 
129 La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §13:4731; N.Y. City Domestic Relations Court Act (Supp. 
1954) §lll. 
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Another problem is faced by persons in need when help is not 
forthcoming, either from the public authorities or from the re-
sponsible relatives themselves when it is demanded. The depend-
ent person might then apply to a willing party for aid, e.g., a 
charitable institution. Where the dependent person is in need 
of emergency medical attention, such aid from doctors and hos-
pitals is usually forthcoming and may be given even in non-emer-
gency cases. The question then arises whether the . third party 
who has given aid to the dependent may recover from the responsi-
ble relative for the aid that has been given. A few states allow 
such an action by explicit statutory provisions, 130 but elsewhere 
it is an open question. 
Applying the rule that the statutory remedy is exclusive, the 
courts have usually held that a third party who aids a dependent 
person is a volunteer and therefore may not recover from a re-
sponsible relative the money expended.131 However, there is sup-
port for the contrary position where aid has been rendered in 
an emergency to one who could qualify for support under the 
family responsibility statute.132 The latter cases take the position 
130 E.g., Cal. Civ. Code (1949) §207; Me. Laws (1953) c. 163 (suit by hospital); Miss. 
Code Ann. (1952) §7357. 
131 Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa 512 (1861); Gray v. Spaulding, 58 N.H. 345 (1878); 
Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. (N.Y.) 281 (1819); Rutecki v. Lukaszewski, 273 App. Div. 
638, 79 N.Y.S. (2d) 341 (1948); Belknap v. Whitmire, 43 Ore. 75, 72 P. 589 (1903) 
(dictum). The cases, pro and con, are discussed in ll(j A.L.R. 1281 (1938). Of course, 
where the responsible relative has requested the aid or has promised in advance to pay 
it, the third _party may recover. Forsyth v. Ganson, 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 558 (1830) (held, 
third party may recover either on promise to pay or on the basis of the duty imposed by 
statute). Whether the promise of a relative to pay for the past support of a dependent 
person by a third person would be binding would depend on whether it was supported 
by a sufficient moral obligation. Cf. Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57 (1828), holding that, 
since the Connecticut statute authorizes an action for future support only, it does not 
provide a sufficient moral obligation to support a promise to pay a third person for past 
support. Accord, In re Allen's Estate, 147 Neb. 909, 25 N.W. (2d) 757 (1947). Some 
statutes provide that a promise by a person to pay for necessaries given to a dependent 
relative is binding. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code (1949) §206, applied in Huntoon v. Powell, 88 
Cal. App. 657, 263 P. 1030 (1928). 
132Tyron v. Dornfeld, 130 Minn. 198, 153 N.W. 307 (1915); Bismarck Hospital v. 
Harris, 68 N.D. 374, 280 N.W. 423 (1938), noted, 23 MINN. L. REv. 243 (1939). Both 
cases involved emergency medical care rendered to the dependent person. The rule 
adopted by these cases is similar to that adopted by some courts, that the cost of emer-
gency care given to a dependent may be recovered from the community of settlement. 
The position of the dissent in the North Dakota case, that their statute requires a promise 
by the responsible relative to pay for necessaries, is persuasive. It should also be noted 
that the majority opinion relied on the fact that the family responsibility provision relied 
on in this case had been enacted prior to and independently of the general assistance law. 
See note 116 supra. Contrast with the cases in this and the preceding footnote the rule, 
previously stated, that the common law duty of a parent to support his child was 
enforceable only by the third person who furnished necessaries and not in a direct action 
by the child. PECK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 3d ed., §126 (1930). 
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that the statute imposes a substantive duty apart from the specific 
remedy which it provides. 
It should be npted at the outset that .there are considerable 
difficulties inherent in an ex post facto suit for support which 
has been given to a dependent person. In such an action the 
court is placed in the difficult position of determining the relative's 
ability to pay at a time which may be considerably removed from 
the date when the dependent person's need arose. This task is 
complicated by the fact that the judgment will require lump sum 
payment rather than monthly instalments. Therefore, however 
hard the court tries to decide the case on the facts as they were, 
the judgment given will in fact require an immediate adjustment 
in the standard of living of the family of the person against whom 
the judgment is rendered. Nevertheless, there would seem to be 
circumstances in which the need for a third party action over-
weighs these considerations. 
One such situation is that where medical or other aid must 
be furnished immediately, with no time to consult with responsible 
relatives. The presence of this emergency factor in the cases just 
discussed may well distinguish them from the decisions cited as 
holding the other way. Third party aid may also be required 
where the responsible relatives fail to give help after the dependent 
has notified them of his need. However, whether the court should 
be at liberty to write an aid-after-notice requirement into the 
family responsibility statute is questionable.133 Statutes in some 
states authorize an action by a third party against the community 
for help given after the dependent's notice of need and failure by 
the community to provide it. These might well be amended to 
include actions against responsible relatives. 
There is also a question as to whether a locality may proceed 
against responsible relatives for support previously provided, or 
whether it is limited to suing for the future support of the depend-
ent person. In the latter event the locality may be reluctant to 
render aid, and the applicant for help may have to depend on the 
results of the locality's court suit, with the possibility of delays 
and even eventual default by the responsible relative. A few 
133 In Tyron v. Dornfeld, 130 Minn. 198, 153 N.W. 307 (1915), the court left open 
the question whether, in other than emergency cases, the third party must give notice 
to the responsible relative. If the relative's suit for contribution could be entertained 
by a court in equity, the judge might be able to authorize instalment payments of the 
judgment and thus avoid the difficulties involved in a lump sum payment. See 4 
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., §1418 (1941). 
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statutes seem to indicate that an action for future support only is 
contemplated.134 Many are not clear as to the precise remedy 
available to welfare officials. Several, for example, provide simply 
for a court action to determine what the relative shall "contribute" 
to the support of the dependent person.135 The cases have usually 
held that statutes of this type provide only for an action by the 
proper public official for future support.136 This seems a fair 
inference in view of the provisions in such statutes for enforcement 
of support orders in cases of default which appear to contemplate 
continuing future support rather than reimbursement. There is 
some authority, however, that even under statutes of this type the 
locality may bring a common law action for restitution.137 These 
cases should be compared with those which hold that a third party 
134 The following statutes do not provide that only an action for future support 
may be brought, but this seems to be a fair inference from their content: Ind. Stat. Ann. 
(Supp. 1955) §3-3005; N.Y. Criminal Code (1945) §915; N.Y. City Domestic Relations 
Court Act §Ill. 
135 Statutes authorizing suits by public officials, which may be said to fall into this 
group, are the following: Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1953) §llllc; Del. Code Ann. (1953) 
tit. 13, §501; Hawaii Rev. Laws (1945) c. 298, §12,290; Miss. Code Ann. (1952) §7357; 
Neb. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1953) §68-101; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 62, §1973 (a); Vt. 
Laws (1953) No. 196, §3; Wis. Stat. (1953) §52.01. 
Whether the dependent person may sue for past as well as future support raises 
similar problems. The statutes in Montana and a few other states authorize the de-
pendent to sue both for future and past support. See the statutes cited in note 128 
supra. See also La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §13-4731, which appears to leave this point in 
doubt. No cases were found which discuss this problem, but on the reasoning of the 
cases cited in note 136 infra, the statutes would probably be found to authorize only an 
action for future support in the absence of an explicit direction to the contrary. The 
statute authorizing a future support action may also apply to third persons and other 
relatives. 
136 Wethersfield v. Montague, 3 Conn. 507 (1821); Waterbury v. Hurlburt, I Root 
(Conn.) 60 (1773); Howard County v. Enevoldsen, 118 Neb. 222, 224 N.W. 280 (1929); 
Sax.ville v. Bartlett, 126 Wis. 655, 105 N.W. 1052 (1906) (under prior statute). 
137 For cases allowing restitution under statutes which did not authorize or may 
have precluded it, see Dept. of Public Assistance v. Cucura, 45 Pa. D. & C. 549 (1942); 
Commissioners v. Dooling, l Bailey (S.C.) 73 · (1827) (relative was outside the state when 
aid was extended). But cf. Commonwealth v. Bauman, 46 Pa. D. &. C. 629 (1943); Dept. 
of Public Assistance v. Marley, 45 Pa. D. & C. 166 (1942). The Pennsylvania statute now 
authorizes the recovery of aid given to a spouse or minor children. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 
1954) tit. 62, §1974 (a). But cf. Dept. of Public Assistance v. Sharago, 381 Pa. 74, 112 
A. (2d) 162 (1955). 
The courts have held, however, that a promise by a responsible relative to pay the 
locality for the past support of the dependent person is not binding. Lebanon v. Griffin, 
45 N.H. 558 (1864). Cf. Freeman v. Dodge, 98 Me. 531, 57 A. 884 (1904) (promise to 
pay for future support); Wimer v. Worth Twp., 104 Pa. 317 (1883) (town may not re-
cover on responsible relative's promise for a sum in excess of the amount actually ex-
pended on the dependent). Whether the municipality would have succeeded had it 
sued for restitution was not discussed in these cases. See note 131 supra for a discussion 
of the question of whether third parties may sue responsible relatives on their promises 
for past support. 
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who gives help to the dependent person is a mere volunteer, and 
cannot recover from the responsible relative. 
Most of the family responsibility statutes, however, provide for 
an action by the locality to recover any aid actually expended. 
Some of these provide for an action of restitution only,138 while 
the remainder appear to authorize both an action for restitution 
and an action for future support.139 While the argument has been 
made under the latter type of statute that restitution may not be 
obtained until an action for future support has been brought to 
determine the liability of the responsible relative, this has been 
rejected by the courts which have considered it. They have held 
what seems to be implied from the statutes, that an action for 
restitution may be brought in the alternative without first bring-
ing an action to attempt to subject the relative to future liabil-
ity.140 
It is difficult to find a common denominator in the cases that 
have considered the remedial problems that arise under family 
responsibility laws. The courts have not considered the effects 
on the family relationship of the particular decision in question, 
nor its effect on the ability of a person in need to secure help in 
a reasonable length of time. The only unifying factor in all of 
these cases, in line with the apparent purpose of family responsi-
bility, seems to be a desire to save the public expense whenever 
138 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 44, §8; Alaska Laws (1953) c. 110, §§13, 14; Cal. Welfare &: 
Inst. Code (1952) §2576; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 124, §2; Ga. Code Ann. (1936) §23-2303; 
Idaho Code Ann. (1948) §32-1002; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) §16.281 (hospital care only); 
Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §261.02; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1949) §5140.01 (hospital care 
only); N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §50-0119; Ohio Rev. Code (1953) §5113.14; Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) §17-14-1. 
139 Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1952) §70-605; Ill. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) c. 23, §439-2; 
Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §§252.8, 252.13; Me. Laws (1953) c. 308, §97; Mass. Laws Ann. 
(1949) c. 117, §§7, 8; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §16.129; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1953) 
§71-240 (implied); N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 124, §§18, 19; N. J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954) 
§44:1-141; N.Y. Social Welfare Law (Supp. 1955) §§102(1), 104(1); Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) 
§411.470 (implied); R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 69, §§6, 9; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) 
§626 (151). 
140 Los Angeles Co. v. Frisbie, 19 Cal. (2d) 634, 122 P. (2d) 526 (1942) (under prior 
statute); Hamilton Co. v. Hollis, 141 Iowa 477, 119 N.W. 978 (1909); Boone Co. v. Ruhl, 
9 Iowa 276 (1859). But d. Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa 512 (1861). See Tolley v. Malis-
waski, 159 Misc. 89, 287 N.Y.S. 245 (1936), where the point discussed in the text was not 
raised. The New York case is typical of the many trial court cases in that state allowing 
actions for restitution under their statute. Some of the statutes authorizing suits for 
restitution make the relative liable even though he was not able to pay when the aid 
was extended, provided he is able to pay at the time the suit is brought. This is true 
of the New York law. Under some statutes, however, the relative is not liable unless 
the relief agency has formally directed him to furnish support. See Manthey v. Schueler, 
126 Minn. 87, 147 N.W. 824 (1914). 
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possible. Such an attitude, for example, would explain why the 
courts might allow a locality to sue for restitution, although the 
statute does not allow it, but would deny such a privilege to a 
third party. In the latter situation the voluntary assumption of 
responsibility by the third party has already relieved the public 
of its burden. 
B. Uniformity of Interpretation Through Appellate Proceedings 
It is outside the scope · of this study to note the many details 
of court procedure in family responsibility proceedings, if only 
because local variations in practice make a generalized summary 
difficult. Some of the cases involving procedure problems have 
been collected in the footnot~.141 It should be noted, however, 
that the family responsibility statutes have usually been held to 
authorize a special proceeding, summary in character, to which 
the usual common law guarantees do not, in the absence of express 
provision, apply. While constitutional objections have been raised 
as to aspects of procedure under some of the statutes which deviate 
from the due process requirement, such as the absence of a trial 
by jury, they have again been rejected on the antiquity argument. 
As the English family responsibility provision antedates state 
constitutions, the requirement of due process has been held to be 
satisfied since constitutions require no greater procedural pro-
tection to litigants than that which was afforded at the time they 
were adopted.142 
One problem deserving of consideration, however, involves 
the right of either party to the support action to bring a direct 
;141 See In re Henriksen, 182 Misc. 550, 44 N.Y.S. (2d) 406 (1943). Noting that the 
family support action was sui generis, being neither civil nor criminal, the court found 
that the court having jurisdiction over. the place where the "offense" of nonsupport was 
committed had jurisdiction of the action. Where the statute names the court in which 
the support action is to be brought, as in Pennsylvania, some courts have held that no 
action to enforce the support duty may be brought elsewhere. Commonwealth v. Price, 
72 Pa. D. & C. 106 (1950); Commonwealth v. Lanahan, 56 Pa. D. & C. 504 (1945); 
Darlington v. Darlington, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 132 (1887). Cf. Tracy v. Rome, 64 Me. 
201 (1875) (petition by child to be relieved of further support must be filed in county 
where original order made). On the grounds that the remedy provided by statute is 
exclusive, one court has held that a support order is not enforceable by contempt pro-
ceedings unless the statute expressly authorizes it. Dierkes v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 270 
(1880). 
J.42People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896). See also Corn Exchange Bank 
v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218, 50 S.Ct. 94 (1930), upholding a statute authorizing the seizure 
without notice of the property of a deserting husband. The opinion of the New York 
Court of Appeals in the case, by Cardozo, J., is also instructive. Coler v. Com Exchange 
Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 164 N.E. 882 (1928). 
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appeal from the decision of the lower judicial tribunal hearing the 
case to an appellate court.143 While the prolongation of the judi-
cial process in connection with family responsibility actions will 
probably do nobody any particular good, one compelling argu-
ment for allowing appeals is to secure some degree of uniformity 
in questions of statutory interpretation. Whether this would be 
achieved as a practical matter, considering the small sums of money 
that are usually involved and the high cost of appeals, is another 
question. 
These considerations furnish an argument for not separating 
the administration of family responsibility from the administration 
of general assistance but, instead, for conferring on the county 
departments of public welfare the authority to hear such cases. 
To make such a system work the administration of general assis-
tance would have to be lodged in the county departments, subject 
to the control of the state welfare department. What would be 
needed in addition, however, would be the right to appeal the 
administrative decision up to the state's appellate court, in order 
that restraints could be placed on overzealous public officials.144 
Such a system would help secure uniformity at the administrative 
level but would not solve the problem of court costs on appeal.145 
Furthermore, as will be noted later, there are positive reasons for 
separating the enforcement of family responsibility from the ad-
ministration of general assistance. 
In any event, there are a few statutes which expressly authorize 
143 It should be noted, in connection with this discussion, that the right of appeal 
does not appear to be inherent, even in actions recognized at common law. See, e.g., 
Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E. (2d) 399 (1940); ORFIELD, CRIMINAL 
.APPEALS IN AMERICA 32 (1939). 
144 This appears to have been the system in Arkansas. Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) 
§83·608. The statute authorized an appeal by the responsible relative to the chancery 
court after an adverse determination by the welfare department on the relative's responsi-
bility. But Arkansas repealed its family responsibility law in 1955. Ark. Laws (1955) c. 37. 
145 In states where general assistance is presently administered by the county depart-
ments of welfare, under state supervision, some degree of uniformity has been obtained 
since the local department will make the initial determination whether support is owing 
and, if so, how much. However, the department must go into court to secure enforce-
ment of its order, which is then subject to interpretation by the judge who hears the case. 
On balance, for the reasons given earlier, it would still seem most desirable to remove 
the welfare authorities entirely from this area. Even if assessing family responsibility 
were the responsibility of the courts, it might be possible to secure uniformity of ad-
ministration in other ways. If all cases involving family responsibility, even those, for 
example, in which contribution is asked, could be channeled to the "family court" in 
each judicial circuit, that would be a considerable improvement. Thought might also 
be given to methods of facilitating appeals, perhaps by waiving costs. 
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an appeal in family responsibility cases.146 In the absence of 
statute most courts have not allowed a direct appeal on the ground 
that the statutory proceeding is summary and, since it did not 
exist at common law, no appeal from the determination of the 
lower court hearing the case was contemplated.147 A holding of 
this kind does not, it should be pointed out, prevent family re-
sponsibility questions from being litigated in the appellate courts. 
The family responsibility statutes may be collaterally involved in 
litigation, as in the case of the relief agency which, having ex-
tended aid to a dependent person, sues a responsible relative for 
restitution. In_ such a case the agency must prove, for example, 
both that the person helped was eligible for support and that the 
relative in question is liable to pay. Many of the problems of 
statutory interpretation considered here have heen litigated in 
this way. 
C. _ Apportioning Liability 
Another procedural problem which arises in connection with 
enforcing family responsibility involves the question of shared 
liability. No. problem is presented where only one relative is 
responsible for one dependent person. Where, however, there is 
more than one party on either side of the support obligation, the 
question of assessing and apportioning liability arises. 
Strangely enough, the only question that seems to have arisen 
in this connection involves the apportioning of liability for one 
dependent among two or more relatives. No cases have been found 
where more than one dependent seeks support from the same 
146 Ill. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) c. 23, §439-2 (provisions of Illinois Civil Practice 
Act made applicable); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §3-3004; Iowa Code Ann. (1949) 
§252.9; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §411.446; Va. Code (Supp. 1954) §20-88; Wis. S~t. (1953) 
§52.01 (5). 
147 Nantucket v. Cotton, 14 Mass. 243 (1817); Smith v. Lapeer Co., 34 Mich. 58 (1876); 
In re James, 116 Pa. 152, 9 A. 170 (1887); Philadelphia v. Hays, 56 Pa. Super. 352 (1914). 
See Regina v. London Justices, [1900] I Q.B. 438 (no appeal under Elizabethan act). 
Contra, Brown v. Van Keuren, 340 Ill. 118, 172 N.E. I (1930). The Illinois statute now 
allows an appeal. On the ground that the proceeding was summary, an earlier case in 
the Illinois appellate court had held that the family support order was not appealable 
under the general statute authorizing appeals in civil actions. People v. Peters, 173 III. 
App. 564 (1912). Indeed, those courts which have passed on the question have held 
that there is no appeal from family support cases even if there is a general statute 
authorizing appeals which appears to cover the case, e.g., a statute authorizing appeals 
from the court in which the family support action is heard. The courts have held that 
statutes of this type are to be restricted to actions known at common law, and, therefore, 
do not extend to family responsibility actions. Ex parte Pierce, 5 Me. 524 (1828); Eaton 
v. Williams, 51 Wis. 99, 7 N.W. 828 (1881) (under prior statute). 
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responsible relative. How the courts would handle this situation 
is open to conjecture. Perhaps they would determine the total 
amount that the relative can contribute and apportion this among 
the various dependent persons on the basis of their need and their 
relationship to the responsible relative. Some difficulties might 
be placed in the way of such a solution, however, if the responsible 
relative could be sued in more than one court, or if separate actions 
were brought against him in the same court. In the latter event 
the situation might be corrected by the court's power to consoli-
date actions for trial. 
Where there are several relatives able to support one depend-
ent person the first question that arises is whether the dependent 
person may select the person against whom he wishes to proceed, 
or whether he must proceed against certain relatives in a particular 
order. Some of the statutes specify the order of liability, invari-
ably indicating that the relatives most closely related to the de-
pendent must be proceeded against first.148 In the absence of a 
statutory direction of this type, the existence of an order of lia-
bility is not clear. In the usual case, the statute, as did the English 
statute, simply lists the relatives liable, starting with the nearest, 
such as parent, child, husband, or wife. Although some cases 
indicate that there is no order of liability under such a statute,149 
other courts seem to treat the statute, even in the absence of a 
specific direction, as imposing a liability in the order named150 
148 Alaska Laws (1953) c. 110, §13; Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1952) §70-605; Colo. Stat. 
Ann. (1949) c. 124, §2; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 13, §501; ill. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) 
c. 23, §439-2; Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §252.5; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §16.125; 
Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §261.01; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1953) §71-234; Neb. Rev. Stat. 
(1950) §68-102; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §626 (150); Wis. Stat. (1953) §52.01 (4). For a 
case applying such a provision see Johnson County v. Stratton, 111 Iowa 421, 82 N.W. 
955 (1900). 
149 For a decision reaching this result under an earlier New York statute modelled 
on the Elizabethan law, see In re Kasner's Estate, 175 Misc. 832, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 488 
(1941). See also Matheny v. Matheny, 205 La. 870, 18 S. (2d) 324 (1944), holding that 
a mother's obligation to support her daughter under the family responsibility provisions 
of the civil code is not primary to the husband's duty to furnish alimony under another 
provision of the code. 
150 All of these cases have arisen in New York and Pennsylvania trial courts. The 
New York cases have arisen under the provisions of N.Y. City Domestic Relations Court 
Act §101. This provision is rather ambiguous, since it appears to intermingle both 
responsibility for needy relatives and responsibility in the absence of need based on the 
family relation. It contains a series of paragraphs listing, in no apparent order, the 
liability of various relatives, and, in subsection 4, provides, in addition, that the parents, 
grandparents, and children are liable for the support of a dependent person over seven• 
teen years of age. Subsection 5 establishes the liability of stepparents for their indigent 
children under certain conditions. Under this statute the courts have at least indicated 
that the liability of parents is primary. E.g., Whitney v. Harrison, 127 N.Y.S. (2d) 227 
620 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
or, in spite of the statutory order, progressively toward the more 
distant relatives.151 Whether spelled out in the statute or adopted 
by the court, the latter approach seems preferable, since it recog-
nizes that the closer the relationship, the stronger will be the 
family ties. 
The next question is whether liability for support is joint or 
several, and the immediate issue is whether a relative sued singly 
may move to join others responsible as additional parties. If the 
statute imposes no order of liability, perhaps all of the responsible 
relatives might be joined. Even if the statute imposes an order 
of liability, the relative sued ought to be able to join all other 
relatives of the same degree. Some statutes expressly authorize the 
court or a relative named as a defendant to bring in additional 
parties to the support action. Others seem to authorize joinder 
impliedly by providing that liability for support is joint.152 
(1953); Caplan v. Caplan, 177 Misc. 847, 32 N.Y.S. (2d) 43 (1942); Anon. v. Anon., 171 
Misc. 644, 12 N.Y.S. (2d) 837 (1939). As a result, the liability of grandparents is secondary. 
Under the Pennsylvania statute, which simply lists the relatives liable in an order 
similar to that given in the text, the lower courts seem to have held that the order of 
support is imposed in that order. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wright, 28 Del. (Pa.) 522 
(1939); Commonwealth v. Zinnell, 28 Del. (Pa.) 434 (1939). The state supreme court 
has reserved decision on this point, indicating, however, that there may be no order of 
liability. In re Stoner's Estate, 358 Pa. 252, 56 A. (2d) 250 "(1948). 
151 For example, although the liability of a stepparent is listed after the liability of 
a grandparent in N.Y. City Domestic Relations Court Act §101, one court has held that 
the obligation of a stepparent is primary to that of a grandparent. D.G. v. Hermanez, 
204 Misc. 650, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 234 (1953). The court recognized what it considered the 
realities of family relationships, and was therefore averse to discriminating between 
natural children and stepchildren of the same family. The liability of a parent under 
the statute is primary. See note 150 supra. 
152 The following statutes contain explicit provisions to this effect or appear to 
accomplish the same result by other means: Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 13, §501 ("several 
relations of the same order shall, if able, contribute equally"); Ill. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) 
c. 23, §436-12 (actions for nonsupport may be consolidated and liability assessed pro• 
portionately); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §3-3003 (court may bring in new parties); 
Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §252.7 (same); Me. Laws (1953) c. 308, §97 (all relatives may be 
joined); Mass. Laws Ann. (1949) c. 117, §17 (same); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1953) §71-235 
(relatives "jointly and severally liable in the order named"); R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 
69, §11 (court may bring in other parties); Va. Code (Supp. 1954) §20-88 (joint and 
several liability). Two statutes accomplish the same result as those cited above by 
· expressly authorizing any responsible relative to bring an action against any other 
responsible relatives for the assessment of future support for the dependent. Conn. Gen. 
Stat. (Supp. 1953) §llllc; Vt. Laws (1953) No. 196, §3. For a similar provision see Me. 
Laws (1953) c. 386 (family responsibility provision in domestic relations law). There 
are also some jurisdictions where any "interested person," or "any person" may bring 
an action to assess the future liability of a responsible relative. E.g., Del. Code Ann. 
(1953) tit. 13, §501 ("any person interested"); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 62, §1973 (b) 
("any other person"). If this terminology can be interpreted to extend to a responsible 
relative, then these statutes would also appear to allow actions in which the proportionate 
liability of relatives can be determined. 
Statutes providing that the court may assess liability proportionately according to 
the ability of the respective relatives would appear, at the least, to authorize the court 
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Whether, in the absence of such provisions, more than one re-
sponsible relative of the same degree may be joined has led to a 
difference of opinion153 in cases where one relative, sued singly, 
attempts to join another, and in other situations where the court's 
decision indicates whether liability under the statute is several or 
joint.154 While one court indicated that the inability to join other 
relatives would not necessarily preclude a future action against 
them for contribution, 155 the question of securing contribution 
toward past expenditures would also seem to hinge on whether 
liability under the statute is joint or several. There are some 
statutes which specifically provide for an action of contribution.156 
to apportion liability when several relatives have been brought before the court by the 
complainant. E.g., N.Y. Criminal Code (1945) §917; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §626 (153); 
Wis. Stat. (1953) §52.01 (4). See Stone v. Burgess, 47 N.Y. 521 (1872): In re Whitesell, 
18 Pa. Dist. 520 (1909). Perhaps statutes of this sort would also authorize the joinder 
of additional parties. 
153 For cases holding or implying that liability is several, see Tuller v. Superior Ct., 
215 Cal. 352, 10 P. (2d) 43 (1932) (relative sued may not join other responsible relatives): 
Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Cal. 140, 84 P. 838 (1906) (fact that dependent being supported 
by another relative good defense to support action); In re Whitesell, 18 Pa. Dist. 520 
(1909) (fact that there are other responsible relatives in addition to the immediate 
defendant is no defense). Contra: Anon. v. Four Anon., 173 Misc. 623, 18 N.Y.S. (2d) 
578 (1940) (fact that dependent is being supported by another relative is not a defense); 
Commonwealth v. Marzano, 9 Pa. D. &: C. 764 (1927) (same). Note the conflict in the 
Pennsylvania cases. The New York case involved N.Y. City Domestic Relations Court Act 
(Supp. 1954) §101 (4) which states that the relatives there named are "severally charge-
able." However, the court seemed to base its decision on a subsequent provision in that 
subsection that support is to be assessed proportionately on the relatives named. But 
cf. Bemardus v. Williamson, I Wheeler Crim. Cas. (N.Y.) 234 (1823). 
The cases seem to have held, apparently on the overriding public policy basis, that 
one responsible relative may not be relieved of his support obligation by another even 
for a good consideration. Kentfield v. Kentfield, 8 Cal. (2d) 75, 63 P. (2d) 1111 . (1936); 
Kriss v. Kriss, 246 App. Div. 847, 285 N.Y.S. 58 (1936), appeal withdrawn, 275 N.Y. 546, 
11 N.E. (2d) 746 (1937); Wimer v. Worth Twp., 104 Pa. 317 (1883); Commonwealth 
v. Hecker, 82 Pa. Super. 123 (1923). In Mitchell-Powers Hardware Co. v. Eaton, 171 
Va. 255, 178 S.E. 496 (1938), the case was remanded to determine whether a conveyance 
of stock by a brother to a sister, to reimburse her for supporting their mother, was a 
fraud on creditors. The court held that it would not be if the mother qualified for 
support under the Virginia family responsibility statute and if the son were able to 
support her in the manner required. 
154 For example, a relative sued singly for support may allege as a defense that 
there are other responsible relatives. See the cases cited in the preceding note. Should 
the defense be rejected in this instance, the court would seem to be placing liability 
solely on the relative sued, thus indicating, by implication at least, that liability under 
the statute is several rather than joint. 
155 Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Cal. 40, 84 P. 838 (1906). 
156 The statute may directly authorize an action of "contribution." Iowa Code Ann. 
(1949) §252.15; Ore. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1955) §411.425; Va. Code (Supp. 1954) §20-88. 
Or, as in two New England states, the statute authorizing the locality to sue for reim-
bursement may also authorize kindred who have supported the dependent person to 
bring an action against responsible relatives to determine the liability of the latter. 
The effect is to authorize a contribution action. Me. Laws (1953) c. 308, §97; Mass. 
Laws Ann. (Sapp. 1954) c. 117, §7. Where, however, the person bringing the contribu-
622 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
In the absence of such provision the courts are again divided. 
Some decisions, impliedly or expressly recognizing the joint nature 
of the support liability, have found a duty to contribute.157 But 
there are decisions to the contrary, which appear to reject the idea 
that the statute imposes equal responsibility.158 
tion action is not "kindred" who is liable for support, contribution will not be awarded. 
Farr v. Flood, 65 Mass. 24 (1853) (in-law). See the discussion in Part II of the first 
instalmentof this article [54 MICH. L. R.Ev. 497 at 506 et seq.]. 
The South Dakota statute provides, "A parent is not bound to compensate the other 
parent or a relative for the ·voluntary support of his child without an agreement for 
compensation ..•• " S.D. Code (1939) §14.0316. This section was applied in Tesch v. 
Tesch, 65 S.D. 637, 277 N.W. 328 (1938). 
lfi7 Shaver v. Brierton, I Ill. App. (2d) 192, 117 N.E. (2d) 298 (1954), noted 32 
Cm-KENT L. R.Ev. 334 (1954); Jones v. Pool, 323 Ill. App. 293, 55 N.E. (2d) 394 (1944) 
(abstract of opinion only); Rogers v. Rogers, 51 Ill. App. 683 (1893); Wood v. Wheat, 
226 Ky. 762, 11 S.W. (2d) 916 (1928); Succession of Guidry, 40 La. Ann. 671, 4 S. 893 
(1888) (dictum); Pechtl v. Schmid, 172 Minn. 362, 215 N.W. 512 (1927); Howie v. Gangloff, 
165 Minn. 346, 206 N.W. 441 (1925); Manthey v. Schueler, 126 Minn. 87, 147 N.W. 824 
(1914). For a case in which the effect of the court's decision is to compel contribution, 
see Application of Mach, 71 S.D. 460, 25 N.W. (2d) 881 (1947). 
The Minnesota cases require the relative giving support to have had a reasonable 
expectation that he would be reimbursed; otherwise he will be treated as a volunteer and 
recovery will be denied. "While notice that the relative furnishing support expects 
reimbursement will meet the test of these cases, apparently this is not necessary if reim-
bursement was in fact reasonably expected. See Pechtl v. Schmid, supra. The duty to 
contribute which was found in the Kentucky case was rested on the Kentucky criminal 
statute making it a crime for an adult child not to support his indigent parent. Ky. 
Rev. Stat. (1953) §405.080. Because this statute makes the duty dependent upon reason-
able notice that support is required, the court read a similar notice requirement into 
the action for contribution. Because no notice had been given by the relative seeking 
contribution in that case, his action was dismissed. The Kentucky law is discussed in 
a comment, 39 KY.L.J. 451 (1951). . 
Rogers v. Rogers, supra, is an interesting decision. A divorced wife brought an 
action, based on the family responsibility law, against her former husband to secure his 
assistance in the past and future support of their incapacitated, adult daughter. The 
court had no difficulty awarding a decree for past support on the joint liability theory. 
In addition, although the statute then provided that only the state's attorney could 
bring an action for future support, the court awarded a decree to the wife for the future 
support of the daughter on general equitable principles. An action for contribution for 
past support may be based on an express or implied request by one relative to another 
to furnish it. Stone v. Stone, 32 Conn. 142 (1864). But see note 137 supra. 
158 Connell v. Connell, 131 W.Va. 209, 46 S.E. (2d) 724 (1948) (interpreting general 
assistance law). This also appears to be the import of the decisions in Meier v. Planer, 
107 N.J. Eq. 398, 152 A. 246 (1930), and Duffey v. Duffey, 44 Pa. 399 (1863). Both cases 
involved grandfathers who attempted to secure reimbursement from the parents of 
indigent infant children whom they had supported. Neither case allowed restitution, 
although each court handled the problem as if it involved only the duty of the parent 
to support his minor children at common law. The Pennsylvania court rejected the 
grandfather's claim on the ground that one standing in loco parentis to a child is pre-
sumed to render services to him out of affection,· and is not entitled to compensation 
from the natural parent in the absence of an express promise. Cf. Chilcott v. Trimble, 
13 Barb. (N.Y.) 502 (1852). . 
The New Jersey court rested its decision on the absence of a common law duty 
of a parent to support his infant child. It is to be noted, however, that in both juris-
dictions, at the time of these cases, both a father and a grandfather were liable for the 
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There are problems in extending the liability for support to 
additional relatives. Family difficulties and family tensions may 
complicate any attempt to secure contribution. Furthermore, 
because of the tremendous amount of migration that has occurred 
in recent years, the average American family can probably no 
longer be found within the confines of one jurisdiction. This 
would be especially true if the support duty extends to grand-
parents, brothers and sisters, as well as to parent and child. There 
will be natural resentment on the part of the relatives called on to 
contribute support when there are other relatives equally able 
who have been made immune by the accident of state boundaries. 
To a certain extent this situation may be alleviated by the recipro-
cal enforcement of support acts which have now been passed by 
virtually every jurisdiction, and which will be discussed shortly. 
However, these statutes do not appear to apply to an action for 
contribution. 
In an action for future support the best solution can be reached 
where joinder of all the parties within the reach of the court's 
process is possible, as the court is thus enabled to consider the 
problem as a whole in the light of the family relationships that 
have been discussed above. On the other hand, the difficulties 
which are presented by an action for past support have already 
been noted. They are present to the same extent in an action for 
contribution. Therefore, the relative who was subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court at the time of the original support action 
ought not to be subject to a suit for contribution once the rights 
of the parties have been determined. Perhaps the conclusion 
should be otherwise if the responsible relative sued for contribu-
tion, was outside the jurisdiction at the time of the original suit,159 
or could not be found after diligent search. A further considera-
support of dependent children and grandchildren under the applicable family responsi-
bility statutes. Assuming this statute to apply to minor children, the cases in fact involved 
the question of contribution by one responsible relative to another. In the New Jersey 
case, indeed, the grandfather made the contention that he was entitled to reimbursement 
on the ground that he was subrogated to the right of the municipality against the 
father, which would have had to support the grandchild if the grandparent had not. 
The court held that the grandfather was only a "volunteer." 
See also the Pennsylvania cases and statute discussed in notes 152 and 153 supra. 
If the present Pennsylvania statute authorizes the court to apportion the liability of all 
responsible relatives in an action for future support, it may be interpreted to exclude 
an action for contribution toward past expenditures on the ground that the statutory 
remedy provided is exclusive. 
159 Cf. Commissioners v. Dooling, I Bailey (S.C.) 73 (1827) (liability of father to 
third person affording support to daughter). 
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tion is that the support obligation has been fulfilled by one of the 
responsible relatives, who has already been forced to make the 
necessary adjustments in interpersonal relationships and standard 
of living. In contribution cases the judge must be enjoined not 
only to consider the case as if it were one of first impression for fu-
ture support by the relative sued for contribution, but to calculate 
the value of the adjustments that have voluntarily been made by 
the party who assumed the support obligation. 
Because of the difficulties presented when a responsible. relative 
lives outside the jurisdiction where the person claiming support 
resides, not only under family responsibility but under other 
support laws, the legislatures of almost all jurisdictions have in 
recent years adopted some form of reciprocal enforcement of sup-
port legislation aimed at authorizing a civil interstate support 
action. Most of the jurisdictions have adopted one of the forms 
of a bill proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, while a smaller group has copied similar 
legislation first enacted in the state of New York.160 Under the 
reciprocal enforcement statutes a dependent person claiming a 
duty of support on the part of a responsible relative may file a 
petition for support in the state of his residence, which is known 
as the initiating state. If the judge in the initiating state finds 
that a duty to support might exist, the petition is forwarded to the 
appropriate court in the state of the relative's residence, which is 
known as the responding state. The proceeding then continues, 
testimony being taken as needed in both courts, and if the relative 
named in the petition is found to owe a duty of support, the court 
in the responding state issues an appropriate order which is en-
forced like any other.161 
160 The Uniform Act was first proposed in 1950 and revised in 1952. For citations 
to statutes in jurisdictions which have enacted it see 9A Uniform Laws Annotated 58, 
92 (Supp. 1954). Five jurisdictions in addition to New York appear to have adopted the 
New York act. See N.Y. Unconsolidated Laws (Supp. 1954) 50. This list no longer 
includes Kentucky and South Carolina as these states have recently adopted the Uniform 
Act. Ky. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954) §407.010 et seq.; S.C. Code (Supp. 1955) §20-237 et seq. 
Delaware appears to have a unique statute. Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 13, §512. It was 
copied from an earlier Virginia law, different from any other, which has now been 
replaced by the Uniform Law. The problems arising under the various types of statutes 
are discussed fully in Von Otterstedt, "Reciprocal Enforcement Legislation," CURRENT 
TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 164 (University of Michigan Law School Legislative Re-
search Center 1952). 
161 All funds collected by the court in the responding states are sent to the court in 
the initiating state. The procedure has been given in the text only in outline form. 
Details of the procedure may be found in Von Otterstedt, "Reciprocal Enforcement 
Legislation," CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 186-188 (1952) (University of Mich-
igan Law School Legislative Research Center). 
1956] FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 625 
Many problems of interpretation have arisen under these 
statutes, the most difficult being the decision as to which family 
responsibility statute is applicable to the case at hand, that of the 
initiating state, the responding state, or conceivably that of some 
other jurisdiction where either party may have had residence or 
where the failure to support may have occurred.162 Problems of 
procedure will also arise, because the typical family responsibility 
action, if it requires the help afforded by reciprocal support legis-
lation, most likely will involve some responsible relatives who live 
within the dependent's jurisdiction and some who live without. 
Unfortunately, this contingency does not appear to have been 
foreseen by those who drafted the legislation. As pointed out 
before, the reciprocal enforcement statutes do not seem to author-
ize an action by one relative against another for contribution, as 
they authorize an action only by the dependent person and, in 
most cases, by the locality which has given assistance.163 Whether 
a dependent person who has sued relatives living within the state 
could join, by virtue of the reciprocal enforcement statute, rela-
tives living outside the state, is another question. Assuming that 
joinder would be found to be authorized, several complications 
would arise in such an action because the relative residing out-
side the state may be found to be subject to a support statute 
other than that of the initiating state which, presumably, covers 
the intrastate relatives. The problem of determining the appli-
cable support duty will be further complicated if either the initiat-
ing or responding state has adopted the New York act, which re-
states the substantive support duty. Although both the in-state 
and out-of-state relatives might be bound by the statutes of the 
initiating state, the reciprocal enforcement act of the initiating 
state would seem to impose a separate substantive support duty 
on the out-of-state relatives, insofar as it conflicts with the family 
162 Of course, this question will arise with reference to all of the civil support 
statutes covered by the reciprocal enforcement act. For a discussion of these conflict of 
laws questions see Von Otterstedt, "Reciprocal Enforcement Legislation," CURRENT TRENDS 
IN STATE LEGISLATION 218-251 (1952) (University of Michigan Law School Legislative 
Research Center); Ehrenzweig, "Interstate Recognition of Support Duties-The Reciprocal 
Enforcement Act in California," 42 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 382 (1954). For a discussion of the 
manner in which cases have been handled under the New York act see GELLHORN, 
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 182-187 (1954). 
163 The commissioners' bills authorize actions by the community for reimbursement. 
E.g., 1950 Uniform Act, §8. The New York statute has now been amended to provide 
a similar remedy, but originally it did not. N.Y. Unconsolidated Laws (Supp. 1954) 
§2II5-2. Whether a private individual giving aid to a dependent person could bring an 
action under the interstate act is another question. 
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responsibility law of the initiating state. A New York trial court 
has held that the substantive duty created by the New York act 
is controlling in interstate actions.164 Indeed, the New York recip-
rocal enforcement act'. has been found to have created support 
duties · enforceable in intrastate actions where, for example, it 
supplements the local statute.165 The uniform law simplifies these 
problems. It does not attempt to enact separate substantive sup-
port duties but provides simply that those substantive duties 
created by existing statutes may also be enforced in the inter-
state action. 
At least the reciprocal enforcement laws represent a step toward 
the solution of the problem presented when responsible relatives 
live outside the state. How successful they will be, and whether 
additional solutions are needed, remains to be seen. 
V. EFFECT OF FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY LAWS ON THE DEPENDENTS 
ELIGIBILITY FOR AssISTANCE 
The inclusion of a family responsibility provision in general 
assistance laws has given rise to the assumption that family re-
sponsibility for dependent persons is primary, that public responsi-
bility is secondary, and that public assistance, therefore, cannot be 
given until all possibility of securing support under the family 
responsibility laws has been exhausted. This statement is not 
accurate, of course, with reference to those jurisdictions where 
there is no statute providing for the family support of dependent 
persons,166 nor does it seem to be true in most jurisdictions whose 
family responsibility laws authorize only the recovery of assistance 
previously given to persons in need.167 
It is not clearly indicated in the remaining family responsi-
164.Vincenza v. Vincenza, 197 Misc. 1027, 98 N.Y.S. (2d) 370 (1950). A recent change 
in the New York statute does not appear to change the result in this case. N.Y. Un-
consolidatoo Laws (Supp. 1954) §2112. 
165 Davis v. Davis, (Iowa 1954) 67 N.W. (2d) 566. See note 13, supra, for cases 
holding that intrastate family responsibility statutes are not unconstitutional on the 
grounds that they cannot be made applicable to out-of-state residents. But a statute 
expressly made discriminatory might be another thing. 
166 E.g., Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. Cf. Conant v. State, 197 Wash. 21, 84 P. 
(2d) 378 (1938) (OAA statute), noted, 39 CoL. L. REv. 711 (1939), discussing the problems 
taken up in this section as they have arisen under the categorical programs. See also, 
with reference to the categorical programs but also of more general interest, "Relatives' 
Responsibility" Provisions of State Plans Affecting Eligibility for Public Assistance (U.S.-
FSA State Letter #47, March 5, 1945). 
167 These statutes are collected in note 138 supra. However, in some jurisdictions, 
which authorize only an action for assistance that has been expended, the statutes may 
~ indicate that family responsibility is, nevertheless, primary. Furthermore, whenever 
restitution is authorized, the ultimate responsibility for assistance can be made to rest 
on the responsible relatives, so that family responsibility is primary in that sense. 
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bility statutes whether or not family responsibility is primary 
and an answer must come from an analysis of the language used 
in the statutory definition of the need for public assistance, or in 
the wording of the family responsibility section itself. The majority 
of the statutes contain no clue as to how this question is to be 
resolved. Those statutes which attempt to deal with the problem 
fall into two groups. Some seem to have intended to provide that 
only support actually received from relatives will count as a re-
source in determining the individual's need for public assistance, 
providing, for example, that assistance will be given whenever the 
responsible relatives "fail or refuse to maintain" the applicant.168 
Other statutes indicate that the mere presence of relatives able 
to support the applicant will disqualify him from public assis-
tance,169 and one court, in the absence of any statutory provision, 
appears to have taken the same approach.170 
168 Cal. Welfare 8: Inst. Code (1952) §2500 (indigent persons to be supported when 
"not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends"); Colo. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 
124, §3 (support given when relatives "fail or refuse to maintain" applicant); Ill. Stat. 
Ann. (Supp. 1955) c. 23, §§436-12, 439-1 (family responsibility "primary" but assistance 
to be given to persons "whose families are unable to provide them a reasonable sub-
sistence"); Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) §261.03 (same as Colorado); Mont. Rev. Code 
Ann. (1953) §71-237 ("the liability of a relative to contribute to the support of recipient 
of public assistance • . . shall not be grounds for denying or discontinuing public 
assistance''); Neb. Rev. Stat. (1950) §68-103 (same as Colorado); Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 
1949) §5140 (support given when relatives "refuse or neglect to care for and maintain 
such poor person''); N.Y. Social Welfare Law (Supp. 1955) §158 (assistance given to 
persons "unable to secure support from a legally responsible relative''); Ore. Rev. Stat. 
(1953) §4ll.428 (same as Montana). Some of these statutes also provide that assistance 
may be given if there are no legally responsible relatives. See also, e.g., Mo. Stat. Ann. 
(Supp. 1955) §208.010 (income from whatever source considered in determining need); 
N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954) §44:8-125 (similar). For a case applying the Nebraska law 
see Otoe Co. v. Lancaster Co., 78 Neb. 517, Ill N.W. 132 (1907) (facts relating to need 
not proved). 
169 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §2612 (support contribution "as fixed by the court" 
considered as resource); Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §2585 (support given only if no "relations 
of sufficient ability who are obliged by law to support" applicants); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
(1952) §205.590 (assistance given "when there are no other persons required by law 
and able to maintain" applicants); N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 124, §18 (assistance given 
if "such poor person has no relations of sufficient ability''); S.C. Code (1952) §71-131 
(assistance given if applicant has "no relative or other person able to provide and 
legally responsible for his maintenance''); Va. Code (Supp. 1954) §63-209 (applicant's 
income considered, including that due from responsible relatives, which applicant "may 
or should receive''). Similar provisions are sometimes found in statutes authorizing 
hospital care for persons in need. See, e.g., Ind. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §52-ll31; Iowa 
Code Ann. (1949) §255.1; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §261.22 (2); Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) 
§445.020 (1) (hospital care for indigents injured in auto accidents). 
There are also statutes which ambiguously provide that, before giving aid a second 
time, the welfare official must call on all relatives of the dependent person who live in 
the locality, and ask them for support. The consequences of a failure by the relatives 
to provide such support are not indicated. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1951) §52-153; S.D. 
Code (1939) §50-0103. See also Ohio Rev. Code (1953) §5113.04 ("reasonable effort" to 
be made to ge~ support from relatives). 
110 Bloomfield v. French, 17 Vt. 79 (1843). 
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Both statutory provisions just describ€:d would appear to make 
family support primary, but the difficulty comes in determining 
how this "primary" obligation is satisfied. Where there is nothing 
in the statutes on this problem the usual provision that all persons 
in need are to be helped might indicate, on the other hand, that 
assistance should be given first and responsible parties looked to 
afterward. Again, the lack of . conclusive information as to the 
purpose intended to be accomplished by the insertion of the family 
responsibility provision in the poor law makes these questions 
difficult ones. However, in view of the urgency involved in a 
request for assistance, it would seem undesirable to delay the giv-
ing of aid until the responsibility of relatives can be determined.171 
If the giving of assistance must await the result of a court suit 
against the relatives in every case, the effects on the applicant 
might well be disastrous and the administrative costs prohibitive, 
considering the number of actions which will be dismissed. Nor 
do those statutes seem wise which count the presence of relatives 
legally responsible as a re~ource though no support is in fact forth-
coming, since in such cases the applicant is receiving no real help 
at all. 
The cases that have considered this question are far from satis-
factory. Where the statute does not attempt to deal with the 
problem, it has been held, for the reasons indicated, that aid may 
be given even though relatives have not been called on by the 
welfare officials.172 This result has also been reached under a 
171 A recent survey in Illinois indicated that most persons contacted felt that the 
family responsibility requirement should not prevent the prompt giving of assistance 
when it was needed. A Proposed Public Assistance Code of Illinois 125 (Report of the 
Illinois Public Assistanr.e Laws Commission 1947). 
172 Milwaukee Co. v. Green Bay, 249 Wis. 90, 23 N.W. (2d) 487 (1946). This also 
seems to be the import of the decision in Mappes v. Iowa County, 47 Wis. 31, I N.W. 
359 (1879), although all this case actually held was that the contribution of partial 
support by relatives did not relieve the community of responsibility for the deficiency. 
The cases in which these questions have been raised involve suits against localities 
by third persons to recover for help given to an allegedly dependent person, or a suit by 
one locality against another where a town, not the town of settlement, has given such 
assistance and now sues the town of settlement to secure reimbursement. These cases 
are in point because the locality sued raises the defense that the dependent person in 
question was not in need because he had relatives able to support him. The court 
must then decide, in determining whether suit will lie, whether the individual or 
locality which furnished relief had the authority to do so in light of these facts. If the 
court finds for the plaintiff, then it must also find that the person aided was in need, 
in spite of the presence of responsible relatives, because no help from them was in fact 
forthcoming. 
Some of these cases, however, turn on the point that a locality, not the locality of 
settlement, has an option whether to proceed against the relatives of the dependent 
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statute which seemed to predicate need on the absence of actual 
support by relatives.173 In effect, these cases have adopted the 
position that family responsibility is secondary, in that they would 
appear to authorize welfare officials to give assistance first and call 
on responsible relatives later. 
There is authority, however, under a statute of the type last 
mentioned, to the effect that assistance cannot be given until 
support from relatives has been asked by the agency and refused.174 
Although this rule would appear to make family responsibility 
primary, it does not place an undue burden on the assistance 
process and, therefore, is not objectionable. Indeed, such a re-
quirement may be a helpful restraint in some cases. No doubt 
a court taking this view would require that every reasonable effort 
be made by the administrative agency to secure family support. 
But where family responsibility is primary, the question of 
whether a court suit is required to decide if this primary liability 
has been fulfilled has not been answered with satisfaction. Under 
statutes making the failure to receive actual family support a 
condition of need, the courts might conceivably adopt the view 
that a court order fixing liability, followed by a refusal to obey 
the order on the part of the relatives named, must be shown. This 
interpretation seems just as plausible as that adopted by the cases 
discussed above. The problem is particularly acute under the 
type of statute which makes the mere presence of legally re-
sponsible relatives a disqualification. Unless the court were to 
say that the agency may determine whether a relative is responsible 
or not and then advance aid accordingly, it would seem that a 
person or to give him aid and sue the town of settlement. See, e.g., Auburn v. Lewiston, 
85 Me. 282, 27 A. 159 (1893); Cordova v. Lesueur Center, 74 Minn. 515, 77 N.W. 290, 
77 N.W. 430 (1898). Compare Colchester v. Lyme, 13 Conn. 274 (1839) (only town of 
settlement may take advantage of family responsibility laws), and Salem v. Andover, 3 
Mass. 436 (1807) (same), with Chester v. Underhill, 16 N.H. 64 (1844) (implying that 
only locality in fact giving assistance may sue responsible relative). But d. Alna v. 
Plummer, 4 Me. 258 (1826). See also Templeton v. Winchendon, 138 Mass. 109 (1884) 
(dependent not in need if there is relative willing to support her). 
173 Kankakee v. McGrew, 178 Ill. 74, 52 N.E. 893 (1899), interpreting a prior statute 
not materially different from the present provision. Cf. Moultenborough v. Tufton-
borough, 43 N.H. 316 (1861) (under earlier statute). 
174This appears to be the holding in Newark Twp. v. Kearney Co., 99 Neb. 142, 
155 N.W. 797 (1915), where the lack of liability of the locality of settlement appears 
to be predicated in part on the failure of the locality rendering aid to make a demand 
on the responsible relative. Accord, Humphrey v. Goose Prairie, 208 Minn. 544, 295 
N.W. 83 (1940), where the inability of a doctor to collect from the community for 
medical services given to an allegedly dependent person seemed to be based in part on 
his failure to seek compensation from a responsible relative. 
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court ruling would be necessary every time an application for 
assistance is made.175 
This problem could easily be clarified by a statutory indication 
of what the welfare official must do, with respect to family responsi-
bility, before he can render assistance.176 The best approach would 
be to separate the enforcement of family responsibility from the 
administration of general assistance.177 Aid would then be given 
to anyone in need, with no immediate concern about relatives 
who might ultimately be liable for the dependent's support. This 
approach would avoid delay in giving-help and would also relieve 
the general assistance program of the administrative difficulties 
involved in assessing family responsibility. 
Where, however, the application for public aid indicates the 
possible presence of responsible relatives, the applicant should be 
referred to the appropriate public officials for help in prosecuting 
an action for support. This is not to say that the enforcement of 
family responsibility should be placed with law enforcement offi-
175 Some indication that a court action is not necessary under this type of statute 
is afforded by the case of Winchester v. Burlington, 128 Conn. 185, 21 A. (2d) 371 (1941). 
Here a family in need was given aid in a town other than their town of settlement, 
and that town sued the town of settlement to recover the aid that had been given. 
The town giving aid had not, before extending assistance, attempted to call on certain 
relatives who may have been able to provide support. Without discussing this aspect 
of the case, the court found that the town giving aid was entitled to recover because 
the relatives in question were not, in fact, able to contribute. The decision seemed 
based in part on the holding that where aid is extended by a town other than the 
town of settlement, it need not first inquire whether there are responsible relatives able 
to contribute. See note 172 supra. However, the court's opinion also seems to indicate 
· that the question of whether support is available from relatives under the family responsi• 
bility law can be determined by the agency without the necessity of a court suit. Cf. 
East Hartford v. Pitkin, 8 Conn. 392 (1831) (statement that there are no relatives who 
can support dependent sufficient allegation of need). But cf. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) 
§2612 (support contribution "as fixed by the court" considered as resource). 
176 Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §85-611 (which provided that before the applicant 
could be considered for assistance, he must file suit against a relative if the relative 
failed to provide the welfare department with requested information or if there was a 
question as to the relative's responsibility) was repealed in 1955. Ark. Laws (1955) c. 37. 
For state regulations indicating the procedure to be followed in attempting to secure 
support by relatives, but indicating that assistance should still be made available even 
though support is refused, see Manual for General Assistance and Veterans Assistance 
Rule 39 (Illinois Public Aid Commission, April 1952); Minnesota Public Welfare Manual 
§2532 (Department of Public Welfare, June 1, 1953). Both states authorize the giving 
of assistance upon the relatives' failure or refusal to support. The Illinois regulation 
indicates that the possibilities of support by relatives are to be explored before assistance 
is given, and adds that " ... a plan of approach to the relative [should be] agreed upon 
which will strengthen rather than destroy the family relationship vital to the welfare 
of the individual." . 
177 This has often been recommended. See .ABBorr, PUBLIC AssISTANCE: AMERICAN 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1940); PUBLIC AssISTANCE GOALS, 1953, 17, 19 (U.S.-FSA 1952). 
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cials who might be insensitive to the problems involved. Jurisdic-
tion over family responsibility cases, as well as over litigation in-
volving family problems, might be given to an integrated family 
court in which lawyer, judge, and caseworker can cooperate.178 
If family responsibility is to remain primary, however, it is 
suggested that assistance should be given after the responsible 
relatives have refused the welfare official's request to render assis-
tance. This would require the relief administrator to determine 
whether or not the refusal of a responsible relative to help is final 
under the circumstances or if, with some additional effort, help 
might be forthcoming. In those jurisdictions, then, in which the 
giving of assistance is conditioned on first exhausting the support 
obligation, the approach that has been suggested places a difficult 
burden on the shoulders of the public assistance caseworker, who 
is the one directly in contact with the applicant. The success of 
the family responsibility laws depends, in the last analysis, not so 
much on legal concept and principle, but on the caseworker's 
ability to appraise and handle a difficult family situation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In spite of all the insistence on, and public approval of, statu-
tory provisions making the duty of family support in the general 
assistance setting legally enforceable, the details of this concept 
remain largely undefined. There is a paucity of appellate de-
cisions in this area because of the inability to bring direct appeals 
from such cases in some jurisdictions, the small sums that are usu-
ally involved, and the relative poverty of the persons affected. 
Support decrees that are not accepted by responsible relatives 
are probably ignored rather than appealed and, indeed, the law 
may well have fallen into disuse in some communities. 
Even on those issues which have been dealt with at the judicial 
level there is no unanimity of opinion-perhaps because of the 
lack of any accepted postulates to guide the decisions of judges 
(and administrative officials) in this area. The administration of 
any law which involves such generalized concepts as "sufficient 
ability" to pay must be confided to a large extent to the discretion 
of the individual judge and administrator. However, statutory 
178 For one recent survey of the inadequacies of judicial facilities for family litigation 
in one city, see GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 
(1954). 
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clarification would certainly be of some help. If family responsi-
bility is limited as indicated to situations where, on a realistic 
basis, the responsible relative is able to pay, and where undue 
strain will not be placed on an already difficult family relationship, 
then the law may well be workable, and statutory guidance will be 
afforded on the more difficult problems of interpretation. 
